Annual Electricity Network Safety Management System Performance Report

31 October 2025

Ausgrid

Contents



Annual Performance Reporting – ENSMS

Acknowledgment of Country

Ausgrid acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of the lands where we work and live, and we pay our respects to the elders past, present and emerging. We recognise the unique cultural and spiritual relationship, and celebrate the contributions of First Nations peoples, to Australia.

Introduction

The purpose of the 2025 Annual Performance Report for the Ausgrid Electricity Network Safety Management System (ENSMS) is to provide the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), the public, and our customers with an overview of how we have met our ENSMS objectives. This report fulfills the requirements outlined in the IPART Electricity Networks Reporting Manual (October 2024).

The information regarding the performance of Ausgrid's ENSMS has been prepared in accordance with the Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014 (ESSNM). It is intended to assist stakeholders, including our customers and the public, to assess Ausgrid's performance against its ENSMS.

The report is divided into two sections: Part A covers our safety performance from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025, while Part B focuses on bushfire preparedness activities conducted between 1 October 2024 and 30 September 2025. These sections have distinct timeframes to align with financial and fire season considerations, respectively.

Context

Ausgrid manages and operates a network of substations, powerlines, underground cables and power poles spanning 22,275 square kilometres across Greater Sydney, the Central Coast and the Hunter Valley. Each day, we build, operate and maintain this distribution network to provide a safe and reliable energy supply to serve 1.8 million customers, small and large business customers, and those who rely on and benefit from their energy supply.

Background

Ausgrid's electricity infrastructure plays a vital role in our daily lives, so ensuring its safety is of the utmost importance. This responsibility lies at the core of what Ausgrid does.

Electricity networks come with potential safety risks that must be managed carefully. Ausgrid is committed to conducting its business in a manner that minimises the risk its assets, operations and activities pose to the health and safety of employees, contractors, visitors, customers and the community. Managing safety risk is achieved through an integration of the Asset Management System (AMS), Health and Safety Management System (HSMS), Environment Management System (EMS), Electricity Network Safety Management System (ENSMS), processes and work practices, as well as public engagement and awareness programs. Ausgrid strives to be an industry leader by embedding a learning culture and adapting to changing operating environments and emerging risks.

We are committed to transparency, and promptly report all relevant incidents to our industry regulator, IPART. The collection of incident data throughout the year provides us with a comprehensive overview of our safety performance. The performance indicators outlined in this report include proactive measures (indicating future performance) and reactive measures (indicating past performance) that reflect the safety of our electricity network. These metrics are in line with the expectations set by IPART.

Safety is our priority, and we are committed to keeping our electricity network secure for everyone in the community.

Yours sincerely,

Junayd Hollis
Group Executive | Customer, Assets & Digital

Your input matters

At Ausgrid, we value your input. We have developed this report to be easily accessible and comprehensible for our stakeholders and community members. If you have suggestions on how we can further improve the report, we encourage you to share your feedback by submitting an enquiry through the 'Enquires and Complaints' option at ausgrid.com.au/Contact-Us. Additionally, report any electrical emergencies promptly by calling 13 13 88.

A. Annual Performance Reporting – ENSMS

Part A is Ausgrid's response to the reporting requirements in Appendix A - Annual performance reporting framework of the IPART Electricity Networks Reporting Manual - Safety management system performance measurement. This section includes the current reporting period performance measurement data for the period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025 (current reporting period). We have provided data for the previous periods aligned with financial years where it has been possible to do so (some measures have been impractical to shift to financial year reporting in historical periods and have been noted through the report).

Part A reports against a framework of safety performance indicators defined within the IPART Electricity Networks Reporting Manual as per Figure 1.

The information regarding the performance of Ausgrid's ENSMS has been prepared in accordance with the Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014 (ESSNM). It is intended to assist stakeholders, including our customers and the public, to assess Ausgrid's performance against its ENSMS.

Part A is structured around the four 'Tiers' defined in Figure 1 as follows:

- Section 1 describes Tier 1 indicators (Major incidents)
- Section 2 describes Tier 2 indicators (Minor incidents)
- Section 3 describes Tier 3 indicators (Control failure near misses)
- Section 4 describes Tier 4 indicators (Control implementation)

Note: Please refer to the glossary section for definitions and explanations of key terms, acronyms, and specialised vocabulary used within the report.



Figure 1 IPART's safety performance monitoring framework

Part A – Summary

The below summary charts indicate Ausgrid's performance metrics over a four-year average.



Tier 1 – Major incidents



Tier 2 – Incidents



Tier 3 – Unassisted asset failures



Tier 3 – Assisted asset failures



Vegetation contact with conductors



Public electric shock and arc flash incidents originating from network assets



Worker electric shock and arc flash incidents originating from network assets

Indicator Summary 4 year average annual total



Public vehicle contact with energised overhead network asset



Network vehicle contact with energised overhead network asset



Public within safe approach distance of the network



Authorised worker within safe approach distance



Unauthorised network access



Contact with energised underground network asset



Reliability and quality of supply events



Reliability and quality of supply – Critical Infrastructure Incidents



Network-initiated third party property damage events



Network-initiated network property damage events

Indicator Summary 4 year average annual total



Achieved asset inspection tasks



Achieved asset corrective action tasks



Ground based vegetation inspections – Bushfire prone land



Ground based vegetation inspections – Non-bushfire prone land

Indicator Summary ---------- **4 year average** ——— **annual total**

FY25 ENSMS performance summary

In FY25, Ausgrid experienced an increase in major safety and reliability incidents compared to the four-year average, primarily driven by severe storms in January and a public safety incident. While the frequency of worker safety incidents remained stable, the severity of outcomes increased, including a fatality. In contrast, electric shock and arc flash incidents declined, particularly those originating from Ausgrid assets, which reached their lowest level in four years.

The January storms had a notable impact on network performance, leading to long power outages. As it does after every significant storm event, Ausgrid is reviewing its response to improve future readiness. In parallel, the business observed a rise in overhead network contact events involving public vehicles and continued to face challenges from copper theft, which remains a growing threat to network safety and reliability. Despite these pressures, Ausgrid maintained stable inspection volumes and continued investing in safety technologies and operational controls to support a safe and resilient electricity supply.



Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) Driving Grid Stability and Renewable Integration

What?

Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) have emerged as a pivotal technology, transforming the energy landscape by enabling efficient energy management, grid stability, and the integration of renewable energy sources. With advancements in battery technology and declining costs, BESS helps address challenges associated with intermittent power generation and the growing need for reliable, clean energy. These systems support the network by storing energy for later use, allowing for load shifting, peak demand management, and fast response during grid disturbances — all of which are critical in reducing the safety risks associated with electricity supply loss.

So what?

From frequency regulation to voltage support, BESS provides essential services that help maintain grid reliability. By storing excess energy and releasing it during outages or emergencies, BESS supports critical infrastructure such as hospitals, data centres, and telecommunications networks — reducing the impact of supply interruptions and enhancing community safety and resilience.

What now?

Ausgrid continues to deploy BESS technologies to support a sustainable and resilient energy future. Strategic installations will help mitigate supply risks, improve grid performance, and enable greater integration of renewables . BESS is a key enabler in our transition to a more secure and decarbonised network.

Tier 1 – Major Incidents

Major incidents are defined as those that have resulted in significant consequences such as fatalities, life-changing or life-threatening injuries, or injuries to multiple people due to electricity, or network equipment and apparatus. Major incidents also include incidents resulting in significant loss of property including network-caused bushfires, as well as significant power outages affecting reliability and power quality[1,2].

In FY25, there was a fatal incident involving a Lineworker and eight incidents classified as major reliability and power quality events — a decrease from 11 in FY24. Five of the eight incidents occured in January 2025 and attributable to the series of storms that month. The storms that occurred between 15 and 18 January alone caused supply interruptions affecting 140,000 of Ausgrid's customers, making it the second largest event of its kind in the past decade. The severity of these weather events, combined with the increasing dependence on electricity in our community, highlights Ausgrid's critical role in supporting the resilience of communities disproportionately affected by climate change.

Table A.1 Major incidents

ESSNM Objective		Total event count	Description of each major incident reported under the incident reporting requirement
Safety of members of the public		0	No recorded values in the current reporting period.
Safety of persons working on network		1	On 22 May 2025, a Distribution Lineworker working aloft in an elevating work platform (EWP) bucket made inadvertent contact with energised overhead low voltage (LV), which resulted in the fatality of the Lineworker.
Protection of property	Third party property	0	No recorded values in the current reporting period.
	Network property[a]	0	No recorded values in the current reporting period.
Safety risks arising from the loss of electricity supply[b]		8	On 29 November 2024, an 11kV feeder tripped due to due to a fallen tree branch that brought down 11kV mains, interrupting Sydney Water in the City of Ryde LGA. On 1 December 2024, an 11kV feeder tripped due to a suspected lightning strike during a thunderstorm, interrupting a hospital in the Bayside LGA. On 15 January 2025, severe storms occurred across Sydney, Central Coast and Hunter regions. There were more than 150,000 lightning strikes in the Ausgrid area, combined with winds of up to 120km per hour. This interrupted 140,000 customers. On 15 January 2025, a 66kV feeder tripped due to a suspected lightning strike, interrupting the M2 motorway tunnel and customers in the Hornsby LGA. On 15 January 2025, 132kV feeders tripped due to fallen trees during severe storm activity. All customers supplied by Williamtown Zone substation were interrupted including the Newcastle Airport. As part of the same incident on 15 January 2025, 132kV feeders also tripped due to fallen trees, interrupting supply to Williamtown RAAF Base. This was reported separately due to its relevance to a distinct infrastructure facility. On 28 January 2025, severe storm activity occurred through parts of New South Wales, bringing strong winds and rain. These storms immediately followed very high temperatures recorded during the day. The storm activity impacted a large number of customers across extensive areas of the Ausgrid network in Sydney. On 25 June 2025, a vehicle hit a pole within Endeavour Energy's network area, which is interconnected with Ausgrid. This resulted in a protection malfunction that disrupted electricity supply to a detention centre located in the City of Fairfield LGA.

a Network property losses are not reportable under IPART's Electricity Networks Reporting Manual - Incident Reporting requirements. For the purpose of this Reporting Manual, a network operator must report each event in which losses exceed $500,000 in relation to damage caused to electricity works as defined in the Electricity Supply Act 1995.

b As defined for major reliability incidents in IPART's Electricity Networks Reporting Manual - Incident Reporting.

1 The IPART Electricity Networks Reporting Manual – Incident Reporting is available on the IPART website at www.ipart.nsw.gov.au/Home/Industries/Energy/Energy-Networks-Safety-Reliability-and-Compliance/Electricity-networks/Electricity-Networks-Reporting

2 The Ausgrid Resilience Framework can be viewed at http://www.ausgrid.com.au/About-Us/Future-Grid/Climate-Change-Resilience

Tier 2 – Incidents

Incidents are defined as events that result in a person being hospitalised or receiving treatment from a health care professional. This category also includes events resulting in lower-level impacts to public property (including network-caused fires) and smaller power outages.

Table A.2 recorded a slight increase in major safety incidents in FY25, driven by a single public safety event and a large storm-related outage in January. While worker safety incidents remained consistent with previous years, Ausgrid remains committed to reducing these risks and is actively strengthening safe work practices to drive continuous improvement.

Table A.2 Incidents

ESSNM Objective	Total event count	Description of each major incident reported under the Incident reporting requirement
Safety of members of the public	1	On 16 December 2024, a public worker was undertaking tree trimming works adjacent to low voltage Aerial Bundle Conductors on private poles when contact was made to the Ausgrid owned high voltage conductors crossing above. The worker received a suspected electric shock and was transported to hospital. Ausgrid did not contribute to this event.
Safety of persons working on network	5	On 9 August 2024, a Technician was conducting work on an optical fibre signal upgrade project when they slipped on a step and fractured their ankle. They received medical treatment and were deemed unfit for work. On 4 October 2024, a Technician tripped on a length of conductor while preparing for works to replace a pole transformer. They injured their shoulder and elbow. The worker underwent surgery and was deemed unfit for work. On 17 January 2025, two Lineworkers were working in an EWP to repair the network following severe storms. On descent, there was a plant failure and the two workers were ejected from the EWP bucket. The workers sustained multiple injuries, received medical treatment and were deemed unfit for work. On 11 April 2025, a contractor engaged by Ausgrid was conducting vegetation management work when they slipped and fell causing the log they were carrying to land on their wrist, resulting in a fracture. The worker underwent surgery and was deemed fit for restricted work. On 26 June 2025, A District Operator was using a telescopic stick to raise a fuse into the operating position on a pole transformer. During the task, a fuse fell striking the worker on the top of the right foot near the ankle. The worker received medical treatment and was deemed unfit for work.
Protection of third party property	0	
Safety risks arising from loss of electricity supply[a]	5	On 15 January 2025, severe storms occurred across Sydney, Central Coast and Hunter regions, resulting in the interruption of 140,000 customers. Throughout 16 - 18 January 2025 (three reports), severe storm activity that commenced on the 15th continued with persistent rain and strong winds impacting the Ausgrid network. Throughout the storm period, 140,000 customers across Sydney the Central Coast and Hunter regions were impacted. On 28 January 2025, severe storm activity impacted a large number of customers across extensive areas of the Ausgrid network in Sydney.

a As defined for major reliability incidents in IPART's Electricity Networks Reporting Manual - Incident Reporting.

Tier 3 – Control Failure Near Miss

Unsafe electricity discharge can occur when electricity network assets malfunction or cease to carry out their intended functions. This risk is heightened when assets are not maintained correctly or when abnormal prolonged weather patterns cause damage to the network. While it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate the occurrence of asset failures, we employ asset management strategies to reasonably manage asset risk.

Figure 2 shows that overall FY25 performance indicates an increase in annual failures compared to the 5-year historical average. Although La Niña affected results between FY21 and FY23, a primary factor in the higher number of failures in the current period was the extreme weather events occurring in January 2025. This led to a rise in assisted failures associated with our overhead network assets.

Table A.3 lists all functional failures that have occurred to Ausgrid network assets during the reporting period. The table provides a breakdown of Ausgrid's asset population, the number of functional failures and whether these failures resulted in a fire that was contained to the asset or escaped the asset.

Figure 2 Annual Functional Failures ('000s)



Table A.3 Network asset failures

Performance Measure	Population	5-year average annual functional failures[a,b]	Annual functional failures (for reporting period)[a]					
			Unassisted			Assisted		
			No Fire	Fire		No Fire	Fire	
				Contained	Escaped		Contained	Escaped
Towers	725	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Poles (including street lighting columns/poles & stay poles)	516,321	649	7	1	1	720	4	1
Pole-top structures	n/a[c]	617	258	4	1	445	4	2
Conductor – Transmission Overhead	675	6	0	0	0	7	0	0
Conductor – Transmission Underground	209	3	1	0	0	1	0	0
Conductor – High Voltage (including sub-transmission) Overhead	12,140	433	37	0	0	538	3	1
Conductor – High Voltage (including sub-transmission) Underground	9,789	296	327	0	0	30	0	0
Conductor – Low Voltage Overhead	15,383	1,715	259	6	0	1,738	1	0
Conductor – Low Voltage Underground	8,451	526	486	6	0	41	1	0
Service line - Overhead	705,407	6,751	59	14	2	7,410	4	2
Service line - Underground	271,614	208	147	2	0	47	0	0
Power transformers	529	66	65	0	0	13	0	0
Distribution transformers	35,412	146	86	0	0	71	1	0
Reactive plant	297	4	0	0	0	1	1	0
Switchgear – zone / subtransmission / transmission	13,825	122	102	0	0	4	0	0
Switchgear – distribution (Overhead)	90,508	521	401	5	2	102	0	0
Switchgear – distribution (Ground based)	79,866	144	123	2	0	14	0	0
Protection relays or systems	82,080	441	249	0	0	44	0	0
Zone / sub-transmission / transmission SCADA system	3,175	213	29	0	0	6	0	0
Zone / sub-transmission / transmission protection batteries	858	50	29	0	0	4	0	0
Regulated SAPS (Stand-Alone Power System)	10	3	5	0	0	0	0	0

a The functional failure figures in the table are all discrete counts of failure events inclusive of conductors.
b Where applicable, the 5-year average was calculated using available data and normalised where less than five years of history exists.
c Ausgrid does not record all individual pole top structure arrangements (e.g., cross-arms and insulators) in its corporate systems.



Vegetation Contact with Conductors

Vegetation coming into contact with overhead powerlines can potentially cause interruptions or even initiate fires. To reduce this risk, we maintain and manage the vegetation around our network and make use of cutting-edge technologies like Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) imagery, enhancing our ability to gather precise location and encroachment data.

Table A.4 lists the number of vegetation contact related events that have contributed to either an interruption and/or a fire event. These are split into the following categories:

- Vegetation *grow-in* refers to when vegetation has grown into the vicinity of overhead powerlines. In these situations, the vegetation has a high chance of contacting overhead powerlines in light winds or rain.
- Vegetation *fall-in* and *blow-in* refers to when vegetation (such as a decaying tree or branch) breaks apart and falls or blows into overhead powerlines during inclement weather. Saturated grounds due to flooding can also contribute to vegetation falling over, even for an otherwise healthy tree.

Table A.4 Vegetation contact with conductors

Performance Measure[a]	Event Count					Comments
	Current reporting period	Last reporting period	Two periods ago	Three periods ago	Four periods ago	
Fire starts – grow-in	1	2	1	2	3	The number of reported fire starts caused by vegetation grow-ins has remained low and stable over the past five years. Ausgrid has made a minor correction to the historical trend data by removing a duplicate entry that was recently identified in FY21 (four reporting periods ago).
Fire starts – fall-in and blow-in	14	19	16	15	5	The number of reported fire starts caused by vegetation fall-ins or blow-ins varies from year to year, likely influenced by environmental factors such as extreme weather events. Ausgrid has made a minor amendment to the historical trend data following a review, which excluded duplicate events and incorporated fire incidents that were not initially captured in the reported ENSMS dataset.
Interruption[b] – grow-in	103	58	63	64	59	Ausgrid has experienced higher than normal vegetation grow-ins over the current period. Ausgrid is continuing to monitor this trend to determine whether the trend relates to improved data capture from major storm events, increased growth following periods of rainfall (in line with broader vegetation growth trend for Sydney and Hunter region as recorded by the NSW Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development)[3] or from changed network performance.
Interruption – fall-in and blow-in	1,626	1,195	1,111	1,416	1,487	Extreme weather events in January 2025 led to disruptions in the network, including multiple outages caused by vegetation falling or being blown onto infrastructure. Similar storms with comparable network impact last occurred five or more periods ago and are not reflected in the trend data.

a Vegetation hazard definitions as per the Industry Safety Steering Committee *Guide for the Management of Vegetation in the Vicinity of Electricity Assets (ISSC3).*[4]
b Includes momentary interruptions.

3 Refer to the Plant Growth Index (PGI) NSW Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development at https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/climate_applications/ssu-archive/2025/july-2025/monthly-indicators/seasonal-conditions-and-drought-assessment/plant-growth-index

4 ISSC3 is available on the NSW Government website for Climate and Energy Action at www.energy.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-08/2016_11_ISSC3_GuidelineForManagingVegetationNearPowerLines.pdf

Copper Theft – A Growing Threat to Network Safety and Reliability

What?
Copper theft across the energy and other sectors continues to rise. Incidents linked to copper theft continue to trend upward and increasingly involve members of the public taking serious risks to remove copper from the network — including pillars, overhead conductors, and in some cases breaking into secured substations. Offenders are also targeting live infrastructure by cutting down power poles and stripping earth wires.

So what?
These criminal acts are endangering lives. Exposed and fallen powerlines pose a direct threat to public safety, while emergency crews are diverted from critical response duties. Every theft increases the risk of injury, prolongs outages, and impacts thousands of customers. Several offenders have been successfully identified and convicted, but the threat continues.

What now?
We're working closely with NSW Police and Crimestoppers to investigate incidents and raise public awareness. All copper thefts are reported, and we urge the community to stay vigilant. If you see fallen powerlines, assume they are live, stay at least eight metres back, and call Ausgrid on 13 13 88. Anyone with information should contact Crimestoppers on 1800 333 000.

To strengthen our response, we are:

- Continuous enhancements to public awareness and education programs.
- Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) program to monitor and deter unauthorised access.
- Impedance monitoring to detect stolen earth conductors and unauthorised network changes.
- Proposed strengthening of background checks via AusCheck.
- Alignment of organisational security policy with the Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Program (CIRMP)

Public Electrical Contact Incidents by Intent

> **Copper theft is a serious public safety issue. These criminals are not just putting their own lives at risk but are also endangering the surrounding communities by leaving powerlines exposed, often cut and lying on the ground.**
>
> Sam Sofi, Ausgrid Group Executive for Operations

Unintended Contact, Unauthorised Access and Electric Shocks

Table A.5 presents incidents related to electric shocks that do not fall under the categorisation of 'Major Incidents' or 'Incidents' as defined by IPART. This table also documents situations where unintended or unauthorised contact or close proximity to the electricity network could have led to electric shocks.

In this reporting period, Ausgrid experienced a notable decrease in electric shock and/or arc flash incidents involving all workers (both network and public) and members of the public. 14 of the 22 incidents involved electric shocks with eight of these attributed to domestic settings, mainly due to neutral integrity issues. The eight exposures to an arc flash involved five public workers using tools or equipment cutting into live cables where Ausgrid did not contribute to the incident. The remaining three incidents involved workers and resulted in no injuries.

We saw a notable increase in overhead contacts involving public vehicles. This increase can likely be attributed to an internal system upgrade to improve reporting categories and increased focus driven by SafeWork NSW to improve visibility of these incidents through their 'Speak up App'. Incidents linked to copper theft[5] continue to trend and involve members of the public taking risks to remove copper from the network (e.g. pillars, overhead conductors and in some cases breaking into secured substations). We continue to educate the public around the risks and working safely around the electricity network through our electricity safety website[6] and regular social media posts. Additionally, in consultation with SafeWork NSW, we developed and rolled out three dedicated overhead electrical safety videos promoting our Look Up and Live platform[7] pursuant to an enforceable undertaking between Ausgrid Management Pty Ltd, ACN 615 449 548 and SafeWork NSW entered into on 24 August 2023.

5 Read our March 2024 media release at www.ausgrid.com.au/About-Us/News/Copper-theft-on-the-electricity-network
6 See www.ausgrid.com.au/Your-safety/Working-safely-around-the-network/Working-near-underground-cables
7 www.ausgrid.com.au/Your-safety/Working-safely-around-the-network/Look-up-and-live

Table A.5 Unintended contact, unauthorised access and electric shocks

Detail	Event Count					Comments
	Current reporting period	Last reporting period	Two periods ago	Three periods ago	Four periods ago	
Electric shock and arc flash incidents originating from network assets including those received in customer premises						
Public	9	14	10	4	20	
Public worker	8	16	4	5	2	
Network employee / network contractor	4	10	14	9	7	
Accredited Service Provider	1	1	1	1	2	
Livestock or domestic pet	0	2	0	0	0	
Contact with energised overhead network assets (e.g., overhead conductor contact)						
Public road vehicle	321	216	247	252	242	Some of the increase in overhead contact incidents is due to better visibility from system upgrades, Ausgrid's work with SafeWork NSW to create safety videos about working near overhead powerlines, and the regulator's push to improve reporting through the SafeWork NSW Speak Up app.
Plant and equipment	63	63	94	97	27	
Agricultural and other	40	42	20	24	59	
Network vehicle	1	1	1	0	0	
Contact with energised underground network asset (e.g., cable strike)						
Plant and equipment	88	81	59	71	71	Ausgrid will monitor increases in plant and equipment to identify future trends.
Person with hand held tool	14	27	13	28	20	
Unauthorised network access (intentional)						
Zone / Bulk Supply Point / Transmission substation / switching station	8	2	0	2	1	The increase in unauthorised access substations is mainly attributed to members of the public breaking into secured sites for the purposes of stealing copper or to vandalise property.
Distribution substation	4	1	5	2	0	
Towers / poles	1	0	6	5	2	
Other (e.g., communication sites)	2	0	6	1	2	
Safe Approach Distance (SAD)						
Network employee / network contractor	0	0	0	3	2	The increase in the public breaching Safe Approach Distance is mainly attributed to attempted copper theft from the network (not located within substations as these are considered unauthorised access – refer above).
Accredited Service Provider	0	3	0	3	0	
Public	15	10	12	4	2	
Public Worker	16	23	9	19	27	

Reliability and Quality of Supply

Table A.6 outlines the following occurrences:

- Network incidents not classified as Major Incidents or Incidents by IPART's Electricity Networks Reporting Manual, resulting in hazardous network conditions (e.g., high voltage into low voltage, reverse polarity, compromised neutral integrity)
- Instances of prolonged network voltages exceeding or falling below Australian Standard AS61000.3.100-2011 limits, and
- Network incidents caused by defective neutral connections due to workmanship and asset defects or failures.

These events are hazards that can occur on the network and expose workers, members of the public and property to the electrical safety risk. In summary, the overall performance remains within the expected limits of variation across the reporting periods noting an increased number of neutral integrity issues identified for FY25.

Table A.6 Reliability and quality of supply

Performance Measure	Event Count					Comments
	Current reporting period	Last reporting period	Two periods ago	Three periods ago	Four periods ago	
High voltage into Low voltage	34	40	26	35	45	
Sustained voltage excursions outside emergency range	6	8	25	14	8	
Reverse polarity[a]	1	1	0	3	1	
Neutral integrity due to poor workmanship or incorrect procedure[a]	1	1	2	3	2	
Neutral integrity due to asset defect or failure[b]	213	137	99	138	119	Ausgrid has continued expanding the use of smart meters to detect neutral integrity issues through an AI-powered fault detection tool. As the population of smart meters across the network increases, this approach enhances fault detection and repair processes to help prevent electric shocks. Ausgrid continues to monitor this trend as part of its broader assessment of network performance.

a Events reported as incidents to IPART under People Category 4 – Significant Near Miss.
b The data for the current reporting period has been collected using a revised methodology. Previous periods have been back-cast to align with this new methodology for consistency.



Smarter, Faster Power Restorations with FLISR

What?
FLISR stands for Fault Location, Isolation, and Supply Restoration. It's a key component of our evolving Advanced Distribution Management System (ADMS), designed to enhance automation and speed up power restoration during outages. FLISR has been running in Advisory mode since March 2025, and after reviewing the results we have turned on Automatic mode.

So what?
In the past, restoring power after a fault relied heavily on field crews manually patrolling the network – a time-consuming process that left customers in the dark and increased the risk of regulatory penalties. Now, With FLISR, the system quickly identifies the fault, automatically isolates the affected section, and restores power to as many customers as possible.

What now?
We're working to expand our network of remotely operable devices to extend the reach of FLISR. This will continue to improve public safety and reduce regulatory penalties from prolonged outages, while also giving our Control Room and field teams a head start by enabling faster diagnostics, targeted patrols, and quicker full restorations.

Reliability and Quality of Supply - Critical Infrastructure Incidents

Table A.7 compiles information on supply loss incidents for critical infrastructure, involving:

- Peer groups A1, A2, A3, and B hospitals[8]
- Road tunnels on motorways with emergency evacuation systems
- Situations impacting over 5,000 people due to outages
- Other community infrastructure marked as of National, State or Regional importance by the network operator.

The data highlights supply disruptions in critical infrastructure, such as hospitals and large public buildings, primarily due to asset failures and external causes. The most significant outages were attributed to asset condition and defects, resulting in supply loss. External factors, including vegetation, wildlife, weather, and third-party actions, also contributed to outages, though to a lesser extent.

Severe storms comprising two major weather systems between 15 and 18 January 2025 played a significant role in several of the events shown in the table below and chart insert. According to Ausgrid's post-incident review, these storms were the most severe since 2015. They resulted in wind gusts exceeding 120 km/h, nearly 74,000 lightning strikes, and widespread supply interruptions. The January storms alone accounted for approximately 30 per cent of the total minutes lost during the entire reporting period. Restoration efforts involved over a thousand personnel, with 99 per cent of impacted customers reconnected within five days. The review also identified opportunities to further strengthen incident protocols and organisational readiness for future severe weather events.

The report underscores the importance of maintaining asset integrity and managing external risks, including extreme weather events, to ensure reliable service for critical and community infrastructure.



Table A.7 Reliability and quality of supply - Critical infrastructure incidents

Type of critical infrastructure (e.g., hospital, tunnel)	Minutes of supply lost	Cause	Consequential safety impacts associated with supply issues
Events and buildings where greater than 5,000 people could be affected by an outage	885	Asset Failure - Asset condition or defect	Twenty-five incidents affected this type of critical infrastructure—six more than in the previous reporting period. Of these, five events lasted two hours or longer, which is two more than the previous period. However, none were classified as Tier 1 major or Tier 2 incidents, and the venues were not in use at the time of the events.
	1,018	Externally Caused (nature) - flora / fauna	
	6	Externally Caused (people) - Third party	
	427	Self-Clear (No Cause Found)	
Other community infrastructure of national, state or regional significance	1,817	Asset Failure - Asset condition or defect	Thirteen incidents affected this type of critical infrastructure, nine more than in the previous reporting period. Of these, seven incidents lasted two hours or more, four more than the previous period.
	255	Externally Caused (nature) - flora / fauna	
	35	Forced Outage (capacity constraint) - Overloads (network abnormal)	
	827	Self-Clear (No Cause Found)	

8 For the definitions of NSW Hospital Peer Groups, see https://www1.health.nsw.gov.au/pds/Pages/doc.aspx?dn=IB2025_029

Type of critical infrastructure (e.g., hospital, tunnel)	Minutes of supply lost	Cause	Consequential safety impacts associated with supply issues
Peer group A1, A2, A3 and B hospitals	728	Asset Failure - Asset condition or defect	Twenty-two incidents occurred, nine more than in the previous period. Of these, four incidents lasted two hours or more.
	170	Externally Caused (nature) - Weather	
	254	Externally Caused (nature) - flora / fauna	
	351	Self-Clear (No Cause Found)	
Rail and air transport systems where travel is affected	906	Externally Caused (nature) - flora / fauna	Three incidents occurred, two fewer than in the previous period. One of these incidents lasted two hours or more.

Network-Initiated Property Damage Events

Table A.8 outlines incidents in which damage to public or network property is recorded, with a reasonable likelihood that the network was the cause. Third party property damage claims arise from both supply related network events (e.g., voltage variation, failed network equipment, etc.) and non-supply events (e.g., damage to property because of physical maintenance works, etc).

The data shows a decline in property damage incidents attributed to network activity across both third-party and network-owned assets. While fluctuations have occurred over the past five reporting periods, this year marks the lowest count for both categories, suggesting improvements in asset management, operational controls, or external risk mitigation.

Table A.8 Network-initiated property damage events

Detail	Event Count					Comments
	Current reporting period	Last reporting period	Two periods ago	Three periods ago	Four periods ago	
Third Party property (assets including vehicles, building, crops, livestock)						
Damage (e.g., fire, physical impact or electrical)	229	256	241	252	251	
Network property (including non-electrical assets, e.g., vehicles, building)						
Damage (e.g., fire, physical impact or electrical)	17	21	22	25	24	

Tier 4 – Control Implementation

Table A.9 presents adjustments or modifications made by Ausgrid to its Formal Safety Assessments (FSAs) or risk treatment action plans. This includes key changes made to existing assessments or risk treatments to ensure that the relevant risk is eliminated or reduced so far as is reasonably practicable.

This year, we enhanced our FSAs by incorporating updated risk levels, refined control themes, and trend analysis. These improvements were driven by incident reviews and direct input from control owners, enabling more targeted and effective safety measures. Additionally, we designed and implemented an integrated digital FSA platform aligned with risk management principles to support stakeholder engagement, streamline safety evaluations and enable more robust, data-driven decision-making.

Table A.9 Amendments and Improvements to Formal Safety Assessments (FSA) or Associated Risk Treatments

FSA	Amendments/Improvements
• Public Safety • Loss of Supply • Bushfire Safety	Process enhancements were made across the following FSAs to strengthen alignment with our ENSMS and Risk Management Frameworks across four key areas: **Data Analysis** · Integrated data alignment with established processes to ensure consistency, traceability, and improved analytical capability. **Bow-Tie Analysis** · Reviewed and updated control themes and owner-rated effectiveness. · Alignment of key control documentation with relevant control owners and business units. **Control Performance** · Updated risk levels based on incident data reviews. · Conducted trend analysis to monitor control effectiveness over time. · Assessed risk appetite and SFAIRP (So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable) status to support informed decision-making. **Risk Treatment** · Enhanced alignment of reasonably practicable improvements to key causes, enabling more targeted and effective strategic safety interventions.
FSA	**Associated Risk Treatments**
• Public Safety • Worker Safety • Bushfire Safety • Loss of Supply	**Upgrades to ADMS, WMS and OMS to Improve Network Visibility, Control and Reliability** Ausgrid has delivered a comprehensive suite of upgrades across its Advanced Distribution Management System (ADMS), Works Management System (WMS), and Outage Management System (OMS), collectively referred to as OneNetwork, to enhance network state visibility, operational control, fault response, and restoration capabilities. These enhancements support smarter decision-making, reduce outage durations, and improve system resilience during major events and environmental disruptions. The upgrades encompass: · Further integration of systems with OneNetwork to prioritise supply restoration during major events · Deploy network assets such as cellular fault indicators, remotely configurable switchgear, and field clients, and integrate them with the ADMS to enable faster fault detection and response · Enhance switching governance and digital fault detection from substations to reduce errors and improve reliability · Integration of control and outage systems to improve visibility during weather-related events · System upgrades to streamline National Energy Customer Framework (NECF) processes and reduce planned outage durations · Cybersecurity enhancements and support model maturity to ensure long-term system resilience **Resilience Programme Enhancements for Bushfire Risk and Environmental Threats** The following initiatives were introduced to strengthen network resilience and mitigate environmental risks: · Installation of bushfire damage prevention wraps to protect wood power poles in high-risk areas · Upgrade of conductors across the network, including expanded use of covered conductor (LV and HV) for replacement of aged or fragile overhead assets and small diameter HV mains.

FSA	Amendments/Improvements
	Security and Public Safety Enhancements for Critical Infrastructure Protection The following initiatives were introduced to strengthen organisational security, reduce third-party interaction risks, and improve coordination with external agencies: · Elevated focus on copper theft, vandalism, and arson through public safety awareness programmes and collaboration with NSW Police and industry working groups. · Enhanced organisational security awareness via updated eLearning modules aligned with emerging threat profiles. · Strengthened background checking processes through the proposed adoption of AusCheck, the Australian Government's centralised background checking service. · Aligned organisational security policy with the Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Program (CIRMP), including its implementation to replace the existing framework. · Expanded public education efforts to reduce third-party interaction risks and promote infrastructure protection. **Modelling Enhancements for Risk Treatment, Asset Planning, and Climate Resilience** The following modelling improvements were introduced to improve asset planning and enhance climate resilience across the network. These updates support more targeted investment decisions, better alignment with environmental risk profiles, and improved prioritisation of safety interventions. · Implementation of new LV and HV modelling techniques to identify network constraints and enable targeted project development. · Integration of weather-induced failure data and expanded threat modelling to account for climate variability and changing environmental conditions. · Refinement of statistical models and cost-benefit analysis methodologies to improve asset replacement planning and prioritisation. · Strengthened alignment of risk treatments with emerging environmental risks and strategic safety objectives. **Technology-Driven Enhancements for Asset Inspection and Safety Assessment** A suite of advanced technologies has been deployed to elevate asset inspection effectiveness and enhance predictive safety insights across the network. These innovations enable more proactive maintenance, sharper defect prioritisation, and better targeting of safety measures based on geographic and demographic risk patterns, including these key improvements: · Expansion of drone-based image capture and integration with AI technologies to streamline inspection workflows and improve data accuracy for asset condition assessments. · AI-powered image recognition and forecasting models to automate defect detection, prioritise emerging asset risks, and identify safety trends based on geographic and demographic data. · Deployment of non-destructive pole examination techniques to improve structural integrity analysis while reducing the need for invasive testing.
• Public Safety • Worker Safety • Bushfire Safety	**Digital Twin and Spatial Intelligence for Enhanced Distribution Design** To improve the accuracy, safety, and efficiency of distribution network design, a Network Digital Twin integrated with a spatial insights platform was developed and deployed. This combined solution enhances clearance assessments, supports distribution design activities, identifies opportunities for design optimisation, and enables structured input from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) into risk evaluation processes.
• Public Safety • Loss of Supply • Bushfire Safety	**Technology-Driven Enhancements Supporting Network Fault Detection** The following updates were made to strengthen fault detection and hazard mitigation capabilities using a range of new technologies: · Deployed sensor technologies including broken conductor fault detectors and electric field abnormality detection equipment trials. · Leveraged waveform monitoring, electricity usage analysis, and impedance monitoring to detect faults, theft, and unauthorised network changes. · Applied stray voltage detection and network capacity management tools to identify and mitigate electrical hazards.
• Public Safety • Worker Safety • Loss of Supply	**Video Surveillance and AI Enhancements for Substation Security** Ausgrid expanded its Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) programme to strengthen physical security at critical substations. CCTV and AI image detection technologies were incorporated to enable real-time alerts for third-party presence, improving situational awareness and response capabilities.
• Loss of Supply • Bushfire Safety	**Smart Meter Enhancements Supporting Risk Mitigation and Network Intelligence** Smart meter technologies and advanced analytics were applied to strengthen fault detection, hazard mitigation, and compliance monitoring by detecting faults, theft, non-compliant Customer Energy Resources (CER), and unauthorised activity, supporting targeted safety interventions, improving network visibility, enhancing load forecasting, and verifying outages with greater accuracy. **Electricity Safety Rules Update Enabling Cross-Boundary Resource Sharing and Safer Live Work Practices** To enhance regional coordination and improve safety outcomes, recent updates to the Electricity Safety Rules have introduced key changes. Notably, these updates enable cross-boundary resource sharing, allowing for more flexible maintenance planning and improved emergency response capabilities. These changes also support safer live work practices, reinforcing Ausgrid's commitment to workforce safety and operational resilience.

FSA	Amendments/Improvements
• Worker Safety • Bushfire Safety	**Enhanced Remote Communications through Mobile Signal Boosting** To improve field communications and operational reliability in remote areas, smart mobile signal boosters (Cel-Fi units) were deployed. These devices enhance mobile network coverage, enabling more consistent and effective communication for workers operating in areas with limited signal strength.
• Public Safety • Worker Safety	**Digital and Process Enhancements for Safer, Smarter Warehouse Operations** A series of coordinated initiatives were introduced to modernise warehouse and field operations, enhance network safety, and streamline procurement processes: · Enhancements to the enterprise warehouse management system improved operational efficiency, inventory control, and safety through strengthened quality processes (including photo cataloguing), QR code integration, and digital solutions supporting both warehouse and field operations · The credit card policy was revised to enable more efficient and compliant purchasing of safety equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE). **Integrated Health and Safety Transformation through Digital Systems, Leadership, and Risk Governance** A comprehensive set of initiatives was introduced to strengthen health and safety outcomes across the organisation by streamlining systems, embedding user-centric principles, and enhancing leadership and risk management practices: · Implemented a digital solution to unify multiple systems within the Health and Safety Management framework, alongside a review and simplification of documented work instructions aligned to user-centric design principles, improving data consistency, usability, reporting, and compliance monitoring. · Aligned service documentation with Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) guidance to ensure accuracy and consistency in operational procedures. · Introduced an internal audit programme to assess compliance with AS/NZS ISO 45001 and support continuous improvement. · Undertook a governance review and system refinement to better manage psychosocial safety risks. · Strengthened risk management processes for Fatal Risks, Verification of Competency, and Fitness for Work. · Launched an operational leadership pathway programme to build frontline safety leadership capability and foster a culture of accountability. **Cultural and Educational Initiatives to Strengthen Public Safety Accountability and Worker Safety Awareness** A range of initiatives were introduced to improve safety outcomes through cultural engagement, organisational messaging, and community education: · Cultural and awareness programmes were launched to promote public accountability and reinforce safety responsibilities · Public awareness and education programmes were continuously enhanced to improve understanding of electrical safety
• Worker Safety	**Embedding Safety in Design Across Asset and Fleet Lifecycles** To strengthen safety outcomes from concept through to operation, a safety-in-design approach was embedded across the asset lifecycle and fleet management processes. This ensures that safety considerations are proactively integrated into planning, procurement, deployment, and maintenance activities, supporting safer infrastructure and operational practices organisation-wide. **Critical Control Management for Fatal Risk 3 – Falls from Heights** Following a fatal incident in May 2024, Ausgrid reviewed Fatal Risk 3 – Falls from Heights under its existing Critical Control Management (CCM) framework. The review led to enhanced implementation through updated procedures, targeted training, and verification processes, aimed at strengthening the consistent application of critical controls and preventing recurrence.
• Bushfire Safety	**Auto-Reclosing Risk Assessment for TOBAN Conditions** Ausgrid reviewed auto-reclosing risk assessment protocols under Total Fire Ban (TOBAN) conditions to inform guiding principles for network operation and configuration, enhancing fire safety and operational decision-making during high-risk periods. **Strengthened Vegetation Management for Bushfire Risk Reduction** To reduce bushfire risk and address audit findings, Ausgrid strengthened its vegetation management practices through improved inspection processes, enhanced data management, and the implementation of robust assurance frameworks. These enhancements support more consistent compliance, better risk visibility, and safer outcomes across the network.
• Loss of Supply	**Emergency Restart Procedures for Major Outages** To ensure safe and structured recovery following major outages, clear emergency procedures were developed for restarting the electricity network in the event of a widespread interruption.

Design, Construction and Commissioning

Table A.10 presents the metrics related to designing, constructing, and introducing new or modified network assets within the reporting period. This involves designs and installations carried out by Accredited Service Providers (ASP), which undergo assessment and approval by Ausgrid. The planning and design stage of the network's lifecycle is crucial to network safety. The metrics monitor safety evaluations, audits of these assessments, and safety reviews for Level 1 (expanding network capacity) and Level 2 (service line work) ASP projects.

Activity levels in contestable Level 1 project safety reviews were impacted by Protected Industrial Action (PIA) between August and December 2024, though recovery efforts in the latter half of the year helped mitigate these effects. A change in the certification process also led to the exclusion of 202 contestable design certifications from reported totals. Safety reviews remained steady overall, with non-contestable projects showing a stronger focus on infield Critical Control checks. While review numbers saw a slight decline, this was balanced by increased frontline engagement with Critical Controls.

Table A.10 Design, construction and commissioning

Performance Measure	Current reporting period	Last reporting period	Two reporting periods ago	Three reporting periods ago	Four reporting periods ago
Designs for which Safety in Design (SiD) reports have been completed	1,978	1,760	2,084	1,757	1,472
Designs for which Safety in Design (SiD) reports have been audited	25	25	25	1	2
Contestable designs certified	1,159	1,429	1,469	1,513	1,432
Contestable level 1 project safety reviews performed	4,217	5,468	6,763	6,089	4,926
Contestable level 2 project safety reviews performed	5,262	4,025	8,574	6,238	4,178
Non-contestable project safety reviews performed	19,144	19,612	19,284	14,588	12,355
Project closeout reports completed for contestable projects[a]	0	0	0	0	0
Project closeout reports completed for non-contestable projects	1,111	1,604	1,170	1,211	1,165
Project closeout reports audited for contestable projects[b]	0	0	0	0	0
Project closeout reports audited for non-contestable projects	0	3	0	0	0

a No project closeout reports are produced due to changes in Ausgrid's involvement with contestable connections and a change in the process.
b This period returns to expected historic levels the previous period saw increased inspections due to disconnection and backlog projects.

Inspections (Assets)

Table A.11 reports Ausgrid's inspection volumes excluding the activities primarily targeting preparation and assurance of the network for the Bushfire Danger Period reported in Table B.3 (Vegetation tasks) and Table B.4 (Asset tasks). Inspection tasks not completed within latitude at reporting date are classed as Open and those outside latitude are classed as Outstanding at the end of the current reporting period. Ausgrid manages all outstanding inspection/corrective tasks at weekly and monthly intervals via a combination of multi-level meetings, dashboards, reporting and analysis, work prioritisation and resourcing. Outstanding tasks from the current reporting period are prioritised at the top of the next reporting period.

Inspection tasks are only reported as achieved when all the associated corrective action tasks to address the faults of a particular asset have been identified. More inspection tasks may be achieved than planned due to approved maintenance plan variations and tasks nominally due in the future reporting period that are completed within the early half of latitude period.

The number of achieved inspection tasks has decreased by approximately 8% since the last reporting period, while the number of open tasks continues to rise. The movement is concentrated in Distribution Overhead, which accounts for about 92% of the reduction in Achieved and roughly three-quarters of the increase in Open, with Transmission Overhead contributing most of the remainder. In this reporting period, the pole top hardware inspection program for Distribution Overhead switched to a planned maintenance approach spread across the whole year. This means inspection tasks are now automatically scheduled throughout the year, allowing greater flexibility in timing to help spread out the workload.

The number of corrective Tasks identified has decreased by 11%, and the number Achieved is down by approximately 12%. This trend reflects a smaller intake rather than a decline in delivery performance. The Outstanding tasks are up by 37%, reflecting a backlog in work that arose from delays associated with workforce protected industrial action in the first half of the reporting period. Ausgrid's Job Prioritisation Framework continues to be utilised to manage the residual risks from this backlog, continuously focusing resources on select actions to minimise material risks until the backlog of corrective action tasks are resolved.

Table A.11 Inspections (assets)

Performance Measure	Inspection Tasks				Corrective Action Tasks			
	Planned inspection tasks	Achieved	Open	Out-standing	Tasks identified (all categories)	Achieved	Open	Out-standing
Transmission Substations	9,135	8,793	500	52	918	805	310	609
Zone Substations	42,607	40,756	2,640	80	3,291	2,815	1,162	1,833
Distribution Substations	21,751	20,502	1,430	196	3,220	2,799	1,449	3,838
Transmission Overhead	9,043	8,600	6,483	50	1,654	1,067	1,111	1,989
Transmission Underground	951	954	10	0	238	217	31	27
Distribution Overhead	93,007	90,035	28,529	707	12,855	11,039	7,406	13,490
Distribution Underground	15,070	16,050	6,891	0	1,020	1,312	449	1,324
Regulated SAPS	13	13	0	0	0	0	0	0

Inspections (Vegetation) Aerial/Ground Based

Table A.12 provides information on Ausgrid's vegetation inspection volumes for corrective tasks, excluding activities primarily focused on preparing and ensuring network safety during the Bushfire Danger Period, as detailed in Part B of this report.

Vegetation inspection on non-bushfire prone land is undertaken through a routine vegetation management cycle that identifies vegetation encroachments for cutting that have entered into the minimum allowed vegetation clearance from the network. The objective of the cutting is to avoid any vegetation encroachment into the minimum vegetation clearance between cutting cycles so far as is reasonably practicable. Ausgrid conducts additional inspections alongside those carried out as part of our routine vegetation management program in bushfire prone areas. It is important to note that these routine inspections do not specifically focus on preparation for the Bushfire Danger Period and are therefore separated from this table. For a comprehensive overview of the inspection targets, which encompass both routine and targeted efforts aimed at preparing for the Bushfire Danger Period on bushfire prone land, please refer to Part B. Note that Ausgrid does not perform planned aerial vegetation inspections outside of bushfire prone areas.

The rise in Outstanding tasks reflects inspection phasing. More inspections were scheduled in July 2025 than in July 2024, and about 10% remained listed as outstanding pending assurance checks despite being reported complete in the field. All outstanding vegetation inspections on bushfire prone land required to mange bushfire risk were completed so far as reasonably practicable by the commencement of the BFDP.

Table A.12 Inspections (vegetation) aerial/ground based

Bushfire Risk Category	Population (poles)	Target	Achieved	Open	Out-standing
Aerial					
Non-bushfire prone land[a]	No planned aerial vegetation inspection tasks are targeted for non-bushfire prone land				
Bushfire prone land	Refer to **Table B.3** Vegetation tasks				
Ground based					
Non-bushfire prone land	367,866	70,235	66,834	3,401	643
Bushfire prone land	149,180[b]	34,938	30,783	4,155	144
Total	517,046	105,173	97,617	7,556	787

a Refer to **Table B.3** vegetation tasks.
b The pole population provided does not align with **Table B.2**, as the pole count in **Table B.2** is determined by the number of poles attached to spans that are required to be inspected.



Look Up and Live Campaign

What?

Pursuant to an enforceable undertaking between Ausgrid Management Pty Ltd, ACN 615 449 548 and SafeWork NSW entered into on 24 August 2023, three broadcast- quality electrical safety videos were produced in collaboration with SafeWork NSW, Energy Queensland, Before You Dig Australia, and other Distribution Network Service Providers. These videos promote the 'Look Up and Live' app and aim to improve education and awareness around electrical safety, particularly the risks of inadvertent contact with overhead powerlines.

Scenarios include metro construction sites, scaffolding work, and rural farming operations — all depicting common public worker situations where contact is likely.

So what?

The campaign addresses a critical safety issue: unplanned contact with live overhead infrastructure. By educating individuals to take planning precautions and use available tools, the campaign helps reduce the risk of serious incidents. In FY25, the social campaign delivered 1.6 million impressions, 947,306 reach, 1,487 clicks, and 200 downloads from the Ausgrid website — demonstrating strong engagement and growing awareness.

What now?

Ausgrid will continue promoting the Look Up and Live app and supporting public safety initiatives through targeted campaigns. The final phase of the social campaign will further reinforce safe work practices and encourage broader adoption of industry tools that help prevent contact with overhead powerlines.

Public Electrical Safety Plans and Activities

This section captures the various activities conducted as a part of our Public Safety Network Management Plan. It delineates the programs and initiatives that we either initiate or consistently engage in, all aimed at fostering public safety awareness and providing education pertaining to the electricity network.

Table A.13 Public electrical safety plans and activities

Network operator public safety programs / campaigns	Details
Community Events	In FY25 we maintained a regular presence at community events and coupled that with deeper engagement for upcoming network projects. Across the year we delivered 25 in-person engagement activations across our network area, meeting customers where they are and consistently embedding safety messaging-from staying safe after a storm or near worksites and preparing for planned outages to practical guidance during construction - to help people prepare for upcoming works. Our resilience program also targeted communities at risk of climate-related impacts with practical tools for preparing for unplanned outages. • 21 Aug 2024 - Hunter Homeless Connect • 14 Sep 2024 - Great Cattle Dog Muster, Muswellbrook • 30–31 Oct 2024 - Bring Your Bill Days Central Coast and Wyong • 9–20 Nov 2024 - Steel River East BESS pop-ups — Mayfield Hotel Carpark Markets, Mayfield Library, Mayfield East Shopping Village, Warabrook Shopping Centre • 21–30 Nov 2024 - Homebush Grid BESS pop-ups — Strathfield Library, Homebush Train Station and Mason Park • 6 Mar 2025 - Central Coast Seniors Expo, Gosford • 7–9 Mar 2025 - Everything Electric, Homebush • 14–15 Mar 2025 - Upper Hunter Show, Muswellbrook • 15 Mar 2025 - Climate Solutions Saturday, Australian Museum, Sydney • 29 Mar & 5 Apr 2025 - Grid BESS pop-ups — Cessnock Village Shopping Centre, Huntlee Coles, • 2–4 May 2025 - TOCAL Field Days • 15–25 May 2025 - HCC REZ engagements — Singleton, Muswellbrook, Branxton • 10 Jun 2025 - Sydney as an Urban REZ, Committee for Sydney • 12 & 14 Jun 2025 - Grid BESS pop-ups — Chittaway Bay Shopping Centre, Toronto Town Square, Rathmines
Electricity Safety Week 2024	For the last two decades, Ausgrid has been proudly delivering Electricity Safety Week (ESW) in primary schools across the network area. The program is designed to educate students on how electricity works, how to use it, and how to stay safe around it. Developed in partnership with the NSW Department of Education, the program materials align with the PDHPE syllabus for K-6, supporting the delivery of key outcomes of the Science, English, Mathematics and Drama curriculums. We have continued to build on the program each year, with our resources reaching 820 primary schools (95% participation rate) in FY25. The free ESW resource pack contained lesson booklets for teachers, access to interactive learning modules, safety posters, stickers, and a simple circuit kit. In FY25 we had 106 Ausgrid volunteers visit 44 primary schools to deliver interactive and engaging electricity safety presentations to over 5,400 students. The program was also tailored to support its use at two kindergartens/pre-schools. **The below six key messages are the foundation of these presentations:** 1. Play in open spaces away from electricity poles and powerlines 2. Stay away from electricity substations and power equipment 3. Never put a metal object in a toaster or power point 4. Keep water away from electrical appliances and power cords 5. If you see a dangerous situation, tell an adult 6. If you see a fallen powerline, stay at least 8 metres away from it and anything it may be touching Ausgrid is committed to sharing this program with other distribution network operators, with Endeavour Energy, Essential Energy, and Energy Queensland, all leveraging ESW to extend its reach to even more primary schools throughout NSW and QLD. 

Network operator public safety programs / campaigns	Details
FY25 Summer Safety Campaign	Ausgrid leverages paid media advertising to promote safety messaging across its network area. This includes a mix of channels, with investment optimised to ensure messaging is front of mind for the public when it is most relevant. • **Weather zone:** year around (1 September 2024 – 30 June 2025) across the Ausgrid network geotargeted by postcode, leveraging weather triggers for Storms, High Winds, High-Extreme Fire Danger, Very Hot - Extreme temperatures and Snow. The campaign delivered 5.5million impressions, with an average click through rate (CTR) of 1.2% (above the industry benchmark of 0.8%) resulting in 66,796 clicks showing strong engagement. • **Radio:** we run an annual burst at the start of summer to ensure safety messaging is top of mind heading into the summer period where an increased incidence of storms. The campaign runs across both Meto and Regional stations in Sydney, Newcastle, Gosford and the Hunter Valley ensuring it's targeted to our network area. A total of 279 spots were delivered across 3.5 weeks with an average daily reach of over 1.4million listeners. • **Digital Video:** Complementing our above activity we run digital video advertising reinforcing safety around fallen powerlines after a storm. Our FY25 safety campaign ran from 20 Oct – 31 May delivering 612,219 impressions across digital TV, set top boxes and game consoles in our network area, with a completion rate of 98%. • **Fallen Powerlines Summer Socials:** Running over a 4-week period (11 Dec 2024 – 10 Jan 2025, 2025) paid socials delivered 131, 178 impressions and a reach of 83,090. Overall, the ad generated 4,693 clicks, equating to a strong click-through rate of 3.58%. These results indicate that the messaging resonated well with our audience, successfully driving engagement and awareness over the holiday period.
Bushfire Awareness Campaign	Ausgrid remains committed to educating the public about bushfire safety with a multi-channel approach, utilising print advertising and targeted social media content. **Aerial Thermal Surveying Helicopter awareness** In September 2024, thermal imaging helicopter patrols were conducted to detect hotspots across transmission lines. Communications around this activity included social media updates and print advertising in key network areas for the patrols, local newspapers such as Dungog Chronicle, The Maitland Mercury, Newcastle Herald and The Singleton Argus featured updates to keep residents informed. A targeted social campaign for thermal surveying awareness supported print advertising ran from August – September and served 349,247 impressions, reached 109,727 customers and received 791 clicks. Throughout the year Ausgrid shared 11 Facebook posts to promote bushfire prevention and community awareness, reaching over 101,000 customers. **Pre Summer bushfire preparedness LiDAR activities (April to September)** Pre-summer aerial patrols and a public safety campaign targeting property owners who are responsible for maintaining private poles and powerlines have played a fundamental role in successfully educating customers on bushfire safety. Between April and June 2025, Ausgrid conducted LiDAR patrols across its network to support bushfire risk mitigation. Communications began in March with print advertising in regional publications including the Hunter River Times, Singleton Argus, Coastal Community News, and Town & Country. A paid social media campaign ran alongside the patrols, and an interactive map showing patrol locations and expected dates was made available on the Ausgrid website to help communities stay informed. Two LiDAR social campaigns communicating bushfire LiDAR patrol and bushfire safety awareness ran in March and June, delivering over 1.3M impressions, 693,879 reach and resulting in 1,753 clicks through to the website.
Look Up and Live Campaign (EU Safe Work)	A case study detailing Ausgrid's Look Up and Live Campaign is explained on the previous page.
Ongoing promotion of public safety through socials media	Ausgrid continues to leverage its social media channels to raise awareness of electrical safety and potential electrical hazards. Throughout FY25 Ausgrid shared a total of 97 social media posts with safety messaging, with a significant presence of weather alert and hazard safety messaging deployed in and around severe weather. **In FY25 the digital channels team delivered the following posts:** • 36 Weather • 21 Power Outage Update • 11 Storm Safety • 11 Bushfires • 5 Electrical Safety Week • 5 Electrical Safety in the Home • 3 Before You Dig Australia • 2 Look up and Live • 2 Reporting Hazards • Unauthorised poster attachments

Internal Audits

Table A.14 captures the annual internal audit activities. An internal audit plan is developed in consultation with internal stakeholders to identify areas for audit emphasis, along with a review of industry and general business identified emerging risks. These audits cover many aspects of Ausgrid's operations, of which the ENSMS-related internal audits below are a subcomponent. For each internal audit, processes and controls are reviewed and tested. Non-compliances or improvement opportunities are raised and management actions to address these are agreed along with appropriate timelines for actioning.

Table A.14 Internal audits performed on any aspect of the ENSMS (as per AS 5577[a] clause 4.5.4)

Audit Scope	Identified Non-Compliances	Actions
Ausgrid's EMS (September 2024) included: A surveillance audit of Ausgrid's EMS in relation to ISO14001:2015 requirements.	No non-conformances were identified.	No new non-compliances were identified in the September 2024 audit that required action. Minor improvement opportunities around internal reporting were raised.
Control Room Security (August 2024) included: A review of the physical security of the two control rooms, the respective backup control rooms and the associated network isolation points.	No non-conformances were identified.	No new non-compliances were identified in the August 2024 audit that required action. Minor improvement opportunities were identified.
High Voltage Live Work (October 2024) included: For a sample of tasks, reviewed the pre-work planning completed, allocation to authorised staff and then in-field assessments of the application of the High Voltage Live Work procedures relating to those tasks.	No non-conformances were identified.	No new non-compliances were identified in the October 2024 audit, that required action. Minor improvement opportunities in documentation were identified.
Hazardous Material Handling (October 2024): Review the processes and practices associated with the handling of hazardous materials from required training, initial job/project planning, execution of the project plan in the field, through to decommissioning and safe disposal.	A number of employees were shown as having training courses overdue. The allocation of individuals to the courses needed to be revisited, as many staff with overdue training were not handling hazardous materials but had been allocated the training based on historic roles. This needed to be clarified to ensure that those working with hazardous materials were appropriately trained and had performed respirator fit tests.	The types of hazardous materials work to be performed by internal staff was reviewed. Only staff required to be trained in specific courses had the courses assigned to them, as they were expected to perform this work in the future. Any overdue training for these individuals was completed. Regular reporting was improved to better identify overdue training. Respirator fit tests were re-performed for employees performing hazardous materials tasks.
Contractor Safety (October 2024) included: A review of the effectiveness of processes and controls in place to assess compliance for Ausgrid Contractor safety onboarding in accordance with our WHS requirements. The scope encompassed processes and controls which support compliance, onboarding, safety related pre-qualification and monitoring for all engagement types.	A need for consistent improved awareness and oversight in the management of Contractor safety was highlighted. Improvements required ensuring pre-qualification of contractor staff was consistently recorded and validated in the corporate system and covered all aspects of the tasks they are expected to complete.	Develop improved compliance reporting of contractor pre-qualification to highlight potential issues. Implement an updated roll out for improved communications and training to relevant contract manager personnel. Establish improved criteria to be applied within the pre-qualification system, to be applied for specialist contractor vs contractor vs principle contractor. Update Contractor Safety Procedures to reflect the improved criteria/requirements and communicate the changes to relevant staff. Implement an improved monitoring control to check on worker compliance and associated regular reporting to management.

a AS 5577 is the Australian Standard Electricity network safety management systems, 2013, published by Standards Australia

Audit Scope	Identified Non-Compliances	Actions
IPART ENSMS Bushfire audit remediation (March 2025): In February 2024 an independent external audit was completed for IPART which identified 2 non-compliances. Firstly around vegetation inspections of low voltage service lines in Bushfire zones and secondly around one vegetation defect not being identified in the field. An agreed rectification plan was developed and identified actions, were agreed to be tracked. An internal audit of the effectiveness of the remediation activities to address the IPART ENSMS – Bushfire Risk Management audit findings, was completed.	The agreed rectification plan was completed and the remediation activities reviewed. A reassessment of the existing bushfire zone service mains, private mains and private poles inspection audit regime was recommended. Improved tracking of the Overhead Service Mains Replacement was required. Further improvements in the data correction processes were also identified.	The overall audit inspection regime has been re-evaluated with increased third party and internal resource audits being completed. This has been accompanied with improved reporting of activities. The strategy for the delivery of the Overhead Service Mains Replacement has been updated and improved timelines and reporting now in place. Enhanced data quality assurance processes have been developed, along with two-way formal feedback between field inspectors and the data maintenance team.

External Audits

Table A.15 offers information regarding independent external ENSMS audits. When these audits are directed by IPART, they follow the IPART Audit Guidelines. These guidelines outline the procedures, principles, and minimum criteria for independent ENSMS audits. Two key IPART Audit Guidelines, namely Audit Fundamentals, Process, and Findings and Audit Guideline - Electricity Networks Safety Management Systems, are applicable to all IPART-directed ENSMS audits. These guidelines serve as the foundational reference documents for ensuring the proper conduct of these audits. Additionally, Ausgrid's Environmental Management System, which is an integral component of its ENSMS, undergoes independent external audits in accordance with the necessary requirements to maintain Ausgrid's certification to ISO 14001:2015.

Table A.15 External audits performed on any aspect of the ENSMS (as per AS 5577 clause 4.5.4)

Audit Scope	Identified Non-Compliances	Actions
In July 2024, IPART directed Ausgrid to conduct an audit of its Electricity Network Safety Management System (ENSMS), focusing on safety risks related to loss of electricity supply and bushfire risk management. The audit assessed compliance with clauses 4.2 to 4.6 of the Australian Standard AS 5577-2013. It also reviewed improvements made following the February 2024 Bushfire Risk Management Independent Audit, which had identified areas for enhancement. The audit was conducted between November 2024 and January 2025 and included document reviews, staff interviews, and analysis of system performance.	No non-compliances were identified. One Opportunity for Improvement was noted: Ausgrid should consider updating the ENSMS intranet section under *Training and Competency* to explicitly list contractor requirements, including a link to the contractor authorisation system for training and competency records.	Ausgrid has fully addressed the findings of the February 2024 audit. The system has been updated to better manage bushfire risks. The Opportunity for Improvement has been completed and the ENSMS intranet now includes a link to the contractor authorisation system.
Recertification audit of Ausgrid's EMS in relation to ISO14001:2015 requirements by BSI Group.	Two minor nonconformities were identified: emergency response plans required updating and monthly depot inspections were not always evident.	The agreed improvement actions are being completed by management in accordance with the agreed timeframes.
The NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) conducted an environmental risk assessment for our environment protection licence.	None. The overall environmental risk level was assessed as low.	n/a

B. Bushfire Preparedness

Part B is Ausgrid's response to the reporting requirements in Appendix A - Bushfire preparedness of the IPART Electricity Networks Reporting Manual - Safety management system performance measurement. This section summarises Ausgrid's preparations prior to the commencement of the statutory bush fire danger period (BFDP), which begins on 1 October or earlier where the NSW RFS Commissioner declares a variation based on the recommendation of local Bush Fire Management Committees (BFMCs).

In our ongoing commitment to bushfire prevention, we at Ausgrid, along with our customers and the community, share the responsibility of managing the risk of bushfires by eliminating hazards from our electricity networks so far as is reasonably practicable. Our collective effort safeguards life, property, and the environment[9].

9 For more details on how we are working together to achieve this, visit www.ausgrid.com.au/in-your-community/bushfire-prevention

Part B – Summary

Trends of some key statistics from Part B of this report and from previous reporting periods are shown below.



B.1 Bushfire Risk Profile Across Network Operator's Supply Area

The AFAC (Australian and New Zealand National Council for fire and emergency services) Seasonal Bushfire Outlook for Spring 2025 map in Figure 1 shows that given the prevailing wet conditions and the lack of a clear indication of drier than normal conditions, NSW is expected to have normal fire potential this spring. Over winter, rainfall across New South Wales was mixed. Many areas had a dry start, but July brought increased rain to much of the state, particularly in the north and east. Despite this, parts of central, western and southern NSW remain very dry, with some areas now experiencing long-term rainfall shortages. The outlook for spring suggests above-average rainfall. While this is expected to lower fire risk during spring, it may also encourage significant grass growth in central and western areas.

The Weatherzone Seasonal Risk Report, delivered to Ausgrid on 22 September 2025, has once again indicated the potential for a mild La Niña to develop in late spring or early summer. The El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO)[10] is currently in a neutral phase, with parts of the central equatorial Pacific Ocean trending below average toward La Niña conditions. The newly updated ENSO index (relative Niño 3.4) is forecast to dip close to or just below the La Niña threshold between now and December 2025, indicating a 50% likelihood of a brief, weak La Niña development.

Wetter-than-average conditions are forecast during spring and summer across much of eastern NSW. Enhanced easterly winds feeding into NSW from the positive Southern Annular Mode (SAM)[11], combined with weak La Niña conditions and warm sea surface temperatures, extend this wetter-than-average signal on and east of the Great Dividing Range.

Increased cloud cover and humidity - driven by the negative Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD)[12], weak La Niña conditions, positive SAM, and warm sea surface temperatures - are expected to limit maximum temperatures to near or slightly above average, while minimum temperatures are likely to be warmer than average during spring. These lingering climate drivers should moderate maximum temperatures over eastern NSW, reducing the risk of sharp spikes in extreme heat and increasing the likelihood of prolonged, lower-intensity heatwaves with high humidity.

However, periods of negative SAM are still possible during late spring and summer. These can increase the chances of hot and dry air masses moving east from the Australian interior, resulting in shorter bursts of extreme heat across eastern NSW.

Eastern NSW and the Hunter region are forecast to experience above-average storm activity, particularly from late spring onwards. Heavy and intense rainfall will be the primary risk associated with these storms, with large hail also posing an increased threat, alongside a normal risk of damaging wind gusts.

The NSW Rural Fire Service predicts a near-normal fire risk this spring. This outlook is partially based on expectations of above-average rainfall and average daytime temperatures over the coming months.

Overall, spring is expected to be wetter than average, with milder temperatures, increased thunderstorm potential, and weaker winds, mostly driven by positive SAM and very warm sea surface temperatures. Summer should remain wetter than average, with warm and humid conditions and active thunderstorm potential. However, warmer temperatures under neutral climate conditions may result in bursts of hot, dry weather during negative SAM phases.

- Flooding and heavy rainfall events are an above average risk during spring and summer.
- Heat extremes and heatwaves are less likely during spring with the negative IOD increasing cloud cover across the country. Summer should see warmer conditions with humidity enhancing low-intensity heatwaves.
- Thunderstorm activity is expected to be above average during late spring and summer.
- Strong wind events are a reduced risk during spring and summer.

Figure 1 – Seasonal Bushfire Outlook for Spring 2025[13]



10 The El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is a naturally occurring climate pattern that involves periodic changes in sea surface temperatures and atmospheric pressure across the equatorial Pacific Ocean.
11 The Southern Annular Mode (SAM) is a climate phenomenon that refers to the north-south movement of the westerly wind belt that circles Antarctica. It is characterised by changes in the strength and position of these winds, which significantly affect the climate and weather patterns of the southern hemisphere.
12 The IOD refers to the difference in sea surface temperatures between the western Indian Ocean (near Africa) and the eastern Indian Ocean (near Indonesia and Australia). It has three phases; Positive, Negative and Neutral.

13 The entire seasonal report published by the Australian and New Zealand National Council for Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities

Figure 2 – Ausgrid's network and related bushfire prone land area.



B.2 Permanent / Temporary Declaration of Areas by RFS and Network Operator's Actions

The Rural Fires Act 1997 provides for a statutory BFDP commencing 1 October and ending 31 March in the following year. This declaration can be varied on either a temporary (seasonal) or permanent (recurring) basis due to local climatic conditions and remains in force for the period specified unless it is revoked.

This year, the NSW RFS Commissioner has temporarily altered the commencement date of the BFDP for certain Local Government Areas within Ausgrid's network, in response to local climatic conditions. Three LGAs; Singleton, Muswellbrook, and the Upper Hunter - which typically have permanent variations beginning on 1 September, had their start date deferred to 1 October. Figure 3 below presents a map illustrating the commencement dates of the BFDP applicable across the Ausgrid Network.

Figure 3 – BFDP 2025 commencement for areas in Ausgrid's network.



Aerial Consumer Mains on Bushfire Prone Private Land (HV and LV)

Between April and September 2025, Ausgrid conducted inspections of all identified overhead consumer mains located on bushfire-prone land. Where defects were found, notices were issued to the respective property owners. During the remainder of the year, Ausgrid continues to inspect private poles on a five-year maintenance cycle, which includes poles situated in bushfire-affected areas.

Customers are independently responsible for maintaining their electrical installations in a safe condition and must rectify any identified bushfire risk defects within 60 days. If a customer fails to address a defect, Ausgrid may arrange for the necessary rectification works and seek to recover the associated costs. Additionally, Ausgrid may exercise its right to disconnect supply where there is an imminent safety hazard or where access issues prevent defect rectification. These disconnection provisions are supported by the NSW Electricity Supply Act, relevant regulations, and the National Energy Retail Rules.

Ausgrid identifies all high-voltage customer sites located on bushfire-prone land. These customers are requested to confirm whether overhead electrical installations are present on their sites. If confirmed, they are required to provide Ausgrid with a copy of their Installation Safety Management Plan (ISMP) addressing bushfire risk, along with a statement of compliance indicating that the site meets the requirements outlined in the plan. A response is required prior to the commencement of the BFDP.

Table B.1 presents performance metrics related to private lines and consumer mains for the reporting period. The figures for private lines assessed by Ausgrid will vary annually due to alterations in the classification of bushfire-prone areas and changes in the customer network There has been a noticeable increase in the number of directions issued to customers during the reporting period, with vegetation-related tasks comprising the majority. This trend is attributed to a combination of environmental and operational factors. Prolonged wet weather limited customer access to vegetation areas, delaying pre-season clearance activities and contributing to accelerated vegetation growth. Concurrently, Ausgrid's Vegetation Management team delivered a targeted pre-season toolbox talk to contractors, aimed at improving awareness and identification of vegetation-related risks. This initiative likely contributed to the increased reporting of defects, reflecting both improved contractor vigilance and the impact of seasonal conditions. The increase in the number of customers with unresolved issues exceeding 60 days was primarily due to Ausgrid's proactive engagement, which allowed customers to schedule the necessary repairs. Contributing factors also included adverse weather conditions that restricted site access, as well as the growing financial pressures and cost-of-living challenges faced by customers. Ausgrid assessed the defects and established a timeline for their resolution to ensure risks are reduced so far as is reasonably practicable.

High Voltage Customers (HVCs) requiring additional risk mitigation include those who either did not provide a statement of compliance or were found to have defects necessitating further controls. In such cases, Ausgrid validates that risk is managed so far as is reasonably practicable, which may involve conducting inspections. All HVCs were compliant prior to the commencement of the reporting period, with no further mitigation required.

Table B.1 Aerial consumer mains on bushfire prone private land

Performance Measure	Current reporting period		Last reporting period		Two reporting periods ago		Three reporting periods ago		Four reporting periods ago	
	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
Private LV lines checked by the network operator	23,367	23,367	19,920	19,920	18,009	18,009	17,541	17,541	16,296	16,296
Number of directions for bushfire risk mitigation issued to LV customers by the network operator	n/a	3,523	n/a	1,288	n/a	456	n/a	928	n/a	558
Number of directions for bushfire risk mitigation issued to LV customers by the network operator that are outstanding by more than 60 days[a]	n/a	1,380[b]	n/a	416	n/a	167	n/a	87	n/a	0
HV customers (connection point count) advised to undertake preseason bushfire checks in accordance with ISSC 31	373	373	366	366	373	373	359	359	262	262
HV customers (connection point count) providing statements of compliance in accordance with ISSC31	112	112	97	97	98	98	95	95	92	92
HV customers (connection point count) requiring additional risk mitigation prior to start of the reporting year	n/a	0	n/a	0	n/a	0	n/a	0	n/a	0
HV customers (connection point count) where additional risk mitigation has been completed prior to start of the reporting year	n/a	0	n/a	0	n/a	0	n/a	0	n/a	0

a Refers to directions issued under section 53C of the Electricity Supply Act 1995.
b All bushfire risk mitigation works were required to be completed prior to the BFDP start date under Ausgrid's bushfire risk management strategy. Two customers did not meet this requirement but completed their tasks within one week of commencement. The residual risk was managed SFAIRP through site-specific assessments, documented mitigation actions, and proactive engagement with affected customers.

Pre-Summer bushfire inspections

Table B.2 summarises the pre-summer bushfire inspection targets and performance against those targets. Ausgrid completed all targeted inspections and, once again, had no outstanding tasks. The organisation continues to enhance its approach to mitigating bushfire risk across the network by progressively upgrading legacy service mains with modern, more resilient constructions where reasonably practicable. In the previous year, Ausgrid transitioned to aerial inspections using drones, delivering improved effectiveness over a continuous 12-month cycle, while maintaining the existing three-year inspection rotation for each bushfire capture region. As this program operates on a rolling 12-month schedule, some tasks remained open in accordance with the program schedule.

Table B.2 Pre-Summer bushfire inspections

Pre-summer bushfire inspections	Population	Target	Achieved	Open	Oustanding	Comments
Aerial Vegetation	137,699 (Poles)	137,699	137,699	0	0	Inspection targets are based on all poles identified that are either in bushfire prone land or support conductors that are partially or completely in bushfire prone land.
Aerial Hardware	137,699 (Poles)	66,577	65,438	1,139	0	The aerial hardware program has maintained the same approach as previous years. Over a 12-month period drones are utilised to inspect pole hardware as part of the 3-year cycle. Open tasks not yet due for completion are not reported as Outstanding.
Service Mains	163,540 (Spans)	3,098	3,098	0	0	All inspections are undertaken in accordance with Ausgrid's inspection program. These inspections focus on mitigating bushfire risk associated with the service wire construction that present a higher bushfire risk.
Pole Inspections	137,699 (Poles)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	Ausgrid does not perform dedicated pre-summer bushfire pole inspections. Ausgrid follows the procedure outlined in Table A.12 outlining routine pole inspections, aimed at efficiently reducing bushfire risk.

Vegetation tasks

Table B.3 presents the status of vegetation management tasks prior to the commencement of the BFDP. For over four years, Ausgrid has consistently completed all pre-summer bushfire inspection tasks, a standard that was maintained again this year. A significant proportion of these pre-summer vegetation assurance tasks are identified using aerial LiDAR technology; where LiDAR is not practicable, routine ground-based visual inspections are undertaken. These inspections form part of Ausgrid's bushfire risk mitigation strategy and are conducted ahead of the BFDP, complementing the cyclic vegetation cutting program. It is important to note that Ausgrid also undertakes vegetation tasks that do not have encroachment classifications, such as the removal of tree branches from service wires. Hazard trees are currently identified exclusively through ground-based visual inspections, and any open hazard-tree tasks are being managed, so far as is reasonably practicable, to achieve compliance with NS179, Ausgrid's vegetation management standard. This table only presents data for hazard trees located on bushfire- prone land; however, inspections are also conducted in other areas as part of Ausgrid's broader vegetation management program.

Table B.3 Vegetation tasks

Bushfire risk category	Status	Encroachment Classification A1	Encroachment Classification A2	Encroachment Classification A3	Encroachment Classification A4	Hazard trees
Bushfire prone land	Identified	2,425	5,660	18,233	25,305	271
	Completed	2,425	5,660	0	0	207
	Open	0	0	18,233	25,305	64
	Outstanding	0	0	0	0	0

Asset tasks

Table B.4 provides information on defects generated from routine and pre-summer inspections that are identified within or before the reporting period. Ausgrid continues to enhance its strategy for reducing the risk of bushfires caused by asset-related issues. This includes BFDP adopting a more effective risk-based approach to prioritise asset tasks under its Job Prioritisation Framework. Since the adoption of the Job Prioritisation Framework the volume of tasks required to be completed prior to the start of the BFDP has decreased from last report. This framework now includes additional tasks in the bushfire risk profile, such as pole termite treatments, which were not previously classified as bushfire asset tasks. Ausgrid has again had no outstanding asset tasks at the commencement of the BFDP, and any open tasks are being managed, so far as is reasonably practicable, to achieve compliance with the Job Prioritisation Framework.

Table B.4 Asset tasks

Bushfire risk category	Status	Emergency	CAT 2	CAT 3	CAT 4	Totals
Bushfire prone land	Identified	127	422	3,116	3,940	7,605
	Completed	127	342	751	46	1,266
	Open	0	80	2,365	3,894	6,339
	Outstanding	0	0	0	0	0

Glossary

Term	Definition
Aerial inspection vegetation / hardware	Assessments of powerlines, poles, vegetation and other equipment undertaken with helicopters, planes and/or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) fitted with LiDar and Photographic equipment.
ADMS (Advanced Distribution Monitoring System)	A software platform that integrates SCADA, outage management, and distribution management to improve network visibility, automation, and control.
AFAC	Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council
Agricultural and other	Examples include agricultural equipment, aircraft, watercraft.
AS 5577	Australian Standard Electricity network safety management systems, 2013, published by Standards Australia.
ASP or Accredited Service Provider	PPersons and organisations accredited under the NSW Government's Accredited Service Provider Scheme, established under Part 3 of the Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014.
Assisted failure	Any functional failure of a piece of equipment (component of an asset or asset) where the equipment was subject to an external force or energy source against which the network operator's standards for design and maintenance do not attempt to control.
AusCheck	The Australian Government's centralised background checking service used for security vetting.
BESS (Battery Energy Storage Systems)	Systems that store electrical energy for later use, supporting grid stability, load shifting, and integration of renewable energy
BFDP	The statutory bush fire danger period (BFDP), nominally 1 October 2022 or earlier where the NSW Rural Fire Service (NSW RFS) Commissioner declares a variation based on the recommendation of a local Bush Fire Management Committees (BFMC). In Ausgrid's distribution area the local government areas of Muswellbrook, Singleton and Upper Hunter are on a permanently variation to nominally commence the BFDP on 1 September.
BSP	A Bulk Supply Point (BSP) refers to a location where high-voltage electricity is received from the transmission network. This point connects the higher voltage transmission system to the lower voltage distribution network, allowing for efficient distribution of electricity to homes and businesses
Bushfire prone land / Non-bushfire prone land	An area of land that can support a bushfire or is likely to be subject to bushfire attack, as designated on a bushfire prone land map. A bushfire prone land map is a map prepared in accordance with NSW RFS requirements and certified by the Commissioner of the NSW RFS under Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s.10.3(2).
Category 1 – 4 defects	These categories characterise the condition of an asset and inform the prioritisation of tasks. Category 1 refers to an asset in a degraded state that poses a direct and immediate risk to public or staff safety, requiring rectification within 48 hours. Categories 2 to 4 reflect assets with degraded conditions of decreasing severity, which inform the risk-based priority for rectification. The rectification priority is determined by factors such as asset type, failure mode, rate of degradation, and remaining asset life. However, additional factors and considerations, including the broader consequences of asset failure, also influence the final prioritisation in accordance with the job prioritisation framework
CCT (Covered Conductor Thick)	A type of insulated conductor.

Term	Definition
CIRMP (Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Program)	A regulatory framework for managing risks to critical infrastructure, including electricity networks.
Conductor – LV	LV means 'low voltage' and is defined as a voltage below 1kV ac nominal.
Conductor – HV	HV means 'high voltage' and is defined as a voltage 1kV ac nominal and above.
Conductor – Transmission	Transmission conductors form part of a transmission network. Sub-transmission conductors form part of a distribution network. Transmission and sub-transmission voltages are generally 33kV ac nominal and above.
Consumers mains	Part of an electrical installation consisting of overhead conductors and support structures between the main switchboard of an electrical installation and a support structure that is the connection point with the distribution system.
Critical Control Management (CCM)	A framework for managing high-risk activities through the implementation and verification of critical safety controls.
Digital Twin	A virtual model of the physical network used for simulation, planning, and risk assessment.
Encroachment Classification A1 – A4	Vegetation encroachments into the minimum vegetation clearance as specified in ISSC3 2016 Guide for the Management of Vegetation in the Vicinity of Electricity Assets.
ENSMS	Electricity Network Safety Management System
Fire	A state, process, or instance of combustion in which fuel or other material is ignited and combined with oxygen, giving off light, heat and flame. This includes 'smouldering' or 'smoke' events, and LV wires down events resulting in burning around the point of contact on a combustible surface. Excludes LV wires down arcing events on non-combustible surfaces. Network Scope: Applicable to any fire caused by, or impacting, a network asset.
FLISR (Fault Location, Isolation, and Supply Restoration)	A system that automates fault detection, isolation, and restoration of power to unaffected areas.
Functional failure	Performance of a piece of equipment (or component of an asset or asset) that represents a reduction below acceptable limits of the specification for a piece of equipment resulting in reduced capability required for service. In general, a functional failure is represented by a defect condition where the equipment that is required for service can no longer perform its expected function and which results in an unplanned maintenance action to restore condition to an acceptable limit. Note: operation of protection equipment (e.g. fuse) within its design characteristics is not a functional failure.
GRESB	Global Real Estate Sustainability Benchmark, used to assess ESG performance of infrastructure assets.
Hazardous tree / Fall-in vegetation hazard	As per ISSC 3 visually defective vegetation (which is vegetation that is dead, dying or appears structurally unsound as identified from the perspective of the Network Asset as far as it is reasonably practicable to do so), that is outside the minimum Clearing Requirement distances from Electricity Assets and which may require pruning, cutting, or removal to obviate the risk of it falling, dropping, and contacting the assets.
High voltage into Low voltage	May also be referred to as HV LV intermix or HV injection. Typically refers to a situation where high voltage (HV) and low voltage (LV) electrical systems or components are unintentionally or improperly connected or mixed together
HSMS	Health and Safety Management System

Term	Definition
Incident	Defined in accordance with IPART's Electricity networks reporting manual - Incident reporting, available on the IPART website.
ISSC 31	Industry Safety Steering Committee Guideline for the Management of Private Overhead Lines, September 2019.
Latitude (maintenance standard latitude)	The latitude sets the period of time before and after the Due Date within which the maintenance activity must be completed. Maintenance standards completed within this time period are defined to be completed by the Due Date. This allows for efficient maintenance planning and control.
LGA	NSW Local Government Area
LiDAR	LiDAR Light detection and ranging is a method for determining ranges by targeting an object with a laser and determining the distance using the time taken for the reflected light to reach the detector
Look Up and Live	A public safety campaign and app promoting awareness of overhead powerline risks.
Major incident	Defined in accordance with IPART's Electricity networks reporting manual - Incident reporting, available on the IPART website
Major Event Day (MED)	A day in which the daily total system (i.e. not on a feeder type basis) SAIDI value ("daily SAIDI value") exceeds a threshold value. The technical detail for performing the calculation is contained in Schedule 6 of Ausgrid's Distributor's License obtainable from IPART's web site. MED are to be excluded from the network overall reliability standards and individual feeder standards. Its purpose is to allow major events to be studied separately from daily operation, and in the process, to better reveal trends in a daily operation that would be hidden by the large statistical effect of major events.
Momentary interruption	Defined as interruption to a distribution customer's electricity supply with a duration of 3 minutes or less, provided that the end of each momentary interruption is taken to be when the electricity supply is restored for any duration.
NEARA (Network Engineering and Risk Assessment)	A spatial insights platform used for distribution design and risk guidance.
Network worker	A person who has been authorised by the network operator to plan or conduct work on or near the network. Includes persons employed by the network, persons engaged under a contract by the network operator, and persons authorised by the network operator and working for an Accredited Service Provider.
Network employee / network contractor	Includes all classes of authorised persons (network employee and network contractor). Accredited Service Provider employees are not included when undertaking work for or on behalf of third parties.
Neutral integrity	A condition where the neutral conductor in an electrical system is compromised, potentially leading to safety hazards.
NSW RFS Vegetation Category	Vegetation Category 1: Areas of forest, woodlands, heaths (tall and short), forested wetlands and timber plantations. Vegetation Category 2: Rainforests, lower risk vegetation parcels, remnant vegetation. Vegetation Category 3: Grasslands, freshwater wetlands, semi-arid woodlands, alpine complex and arid shrublands. Buffers are created based on the bushfire vegetation, with buffering distance being 100 metres for vegetation category 1 and 30 metres for vegetation category 2 and 3.
OH	Overhead
OneNetwork	Ausgrid's integrated platform combining ADMS, WMS, and OMS for improved network visibility and control.

Term	Definition
Open (with respect to defects / tasks)	A defect / task that has not been rectified by the network operator at the end of the reporting period but where the time that has elapsed since being identified has not exceeded the standard time that the network operator has set for having the defect rectified.
Outstanding (with respect to defects / tasks)	A defect / task that has not been rectified by the network operator at the end of the reporting period where the time that has elapsed since being identified has exceeded the standard time that the Network operator has set for having the defect rectified.
Peer group A1, A2, A3 and B hospitals	A hospital peer group classification applied to NSW public hospitals as defined by NSW Ministry of Health.
PGI (Plant Growth Index)	A vegetation growth metric used by the NSW Department of Primary Industries to assess seasonal vegetation trends.
Plant and equipment	Cranes, elevated work platforms, cherry pickers, excavators, hand held tools, etc
Pole-top structures	Pole top structures/components is any structure that is attached to a pole to support electricity mains and apparatus.
Power BI	An interactive data visualisation software product developed by Microsoft with a primary focus on business intelligence.
Power transformers	Power Transformers are transformers where the secondary/output voltage is 5kV ac nominal or above.
Public road vehicle	Includes plant and equipment packed up for travel (i.e. plant and equipment travelling on a public road to or from worksite)
Public worker	A party or parties that are conducting work that is not directly associated with the electricity network such as building work, landscaping, landfill work, excavations, road works. Includes the construction, maintenance, adjustment or dismantling of mobile plant and scaffolding.
Private LV lines	Private lines means aerial consumers mains on bushfire prone private land.
Reactive plant	Reactive plant includes reactors and capacitors.
Regulated SAPS	May be referred to as Network SAPS (includes temporary, emergency or permanent SAPS), which consist of a distribution system owned, controlled or operated, or proposed to be owned, controlled or operated, by a network operator.
Safe Approach Distance (SAD)	Encroachment into the applicable Safe Approach Distance for the type of individual involved.
SAIDI	The average derived from the sum of the durations of each sustained customer interruption (measured in minutes), divided by the total number of Ausgrid's customers (averaged over the financial year).
SAP	Systems, Applications and Products which is a business application to manage to financials, logistics, human resources, assets, safety and other business areas.
Service mains / Service line	The electricity authority's conductors connecting the electricity distribution system to an individual customer's connection point (refer to the NSW Service and Installation Rules for further information on service connections and definitions).
SFAIRP	So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable. Typically referring to the requirement to ensure that risks / hazards are being eliminated (or if unable to be eliminated, minimised) so far as is reasonably practice.

Term	Definition
Shock	Reportable electric shocks greater than 50V rms that are to be reported to IPART and excluding those resulting from static discharge, defibrillators and where the system is nominally extra low voltage or involving the DC rail traction system
Span	A section of overhead conductor between two supporting poles or structures. The term may also refer to the horizontal distance between the two pole attachment points
Speak Up App	A SafeWork NSW mobile application used to report safety concerns and incidents.
Sustainalytics	A global ESG ratings agency that assesses sustainability risk.
Sustained voltage excursions outside emergency range	The Australian Standard AS 61000.3.100 defines and outlines measurement methodologies for steady-state voltage limits in public electricity systems. The main objectives of this standard are: • Define and describe the permissible limits of steady-state voltage variation at customer connection points within public electricity systems. • Establish a standardised methodology for assessing steady-state voltage parameters using power quality monitors. • Recommend threshold voltage levels for the detection of voltage dips and voltage swells that align with the specified steady-state voltage limits.
TOBAN (Total Fire Ban)	A declaration by fire authorities prohibiting activities that may start fires during high-risk periods.
Tunnel	A tunnel owned and maintained by Ausgrid to provide an underground feeder path.
UG	Underground
Unassisted failure	Any functional failure of a piece of equipment (component of an asset or asset) where the cause of the failure is of a type for which the network operator's design and maintenance standards include specific controls to mitigate against the risk of failure and which is neither an assisted failure nor a maintenance induced failure. These failures are generally caused by a deterioration of the condition of the equipment and also include overhead connection failures and vegetation within the mandatory vegetation clearance window.
XLPE	Cross-linked polyethylene insulated cable

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